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A key feature of water policy reform in Australia has been the separation of water
access entitlements from land titles and the establishment of markets for water.
However, the separation of water entitlements from land failed to account for a
number of characteristics that were implicit in the joint right. This has given rise to a
number of third party effects as water is traded in an incomplete market. This paper
describes four third-party effects of water trade; reliability of supply, timeliness of delivery,
storage and delivery charges, and water quality and examines policy responses to
address these effects. The discussion draws on the concepts of exclusiveness and
rivalry to determine the applicability of property rights and other solutions to the third-
party effects of trade. It is likely that many of the third-party effects of trade discussed
in this paper do not warrant policy intervention at the national or state level, but inter-
vention at the local level may be warranted. The costs of addressing some third-party
effects may outweigh the beneﬁts. Where there are signiﬁcant gains from trade, the








The focus of water policy in Australia over recent decades has changed from
assisting ongoing resource development for consumptive use, to managing
competing demands for a fully allocated resource. A turning point in Australia’s
water policy occurred in 1994, when the Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) agreed to a water reform framework (COAG 1994).
A key feature of the 1994 reforms included the introduction of a cap on
diverting water from the Murray–Darling Basin, the area with the largest
agricultural water use in Australia. The objective of the cap is to achieve a
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balance between the economic and social beneﬁts of water resource development
and the provision of water for ecological purposes.
The cap on diversions and the provision of water for the environment have
been accompanied by the separation of water access entitlements from land
titles and the establishment of a market for water trade. In this context, trade
allows water resources to move from uses that generate relatively low economic
returns to those generating greater returns. Trade of water property rights
can play a pivotal role in minimising the economic and social costs of obtaining
additional water for the environment.
The National Water Initiative (2004) was designed to complement and
extend the reform agenda commenced in 1994 and sought to further expand
water trading (COAG 2004). However, trade has been constrained by a
number of institutional issues and, to date, the volume of trade in permanent
entitlements has been small (Goesch and Beare 2004).
The separation of water entitlements from land ownership is a necessary
but not sufﬁcient condition to ensure that a water market is complete. In the
absence of fully deﬁned property rights, trade has the potential to create
adverse third-party effects that prevent the beneﬁts of trade from being fully
realised, or to have distributional effects that can have impacts on the wealth
of other water users. Note that the existence of some third-party effects has
been raised as a reason to impede trade (Goesch and Beare 2004).
The objectives in this paper are to identify key potential third-party effects
of water trade under existing property rights structures in Australia and,
where possible, to assess the relative signiﬁcance of these effects. Examples
are drawn from the southern Murray–Darling Basin system. 
In the ﬁrst section of this paper, water property rights, water use and trade
are described. In the second section, a description is provided of four third-
party effects of water trade that are related to reliability of supply, timeliness
of delivery, storage and delivery charges, and water quality. Available policy
instruments to address these effects are considered in the third section, drawing
on a framework using the concepts of exclusiveness and rivalry (Randall
1983). The relative importance of each effect is discussed in the ﬁnal section,
to help policy makers determine whether potential reforms are worthwhile
and to guide the prioritisation of reform efforts. 
 
2. Water property rights and use
 
Irrigated agriculture contributes just over a quarter of the value of agricul-




A9.6 billion a year (Australian Bureau
of Statistics 2004). The focus in this paper is on the southern Murray–Darling
Basin region, located in the south-east of Australia and extending across
the jurisdictional boundaries of Victoria, New South Wales, the Australian
Capital Territory, and South Australia (see Figure 1). This region accounts
for around 70 per cent of irrigated agriculture in Australia. It is characterised by
the provision of large-scale public and private infrastructure to regulate water 
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delivery on a district basis to farms. The southern Murray–Darling Basin is
hydrologically linked, enabling intraregional (within valley) and interregional
(between valleys or states) water trading. It covers eight irrigation districts supplied
by two main river systems: the River Murray and the Murrumbidgee River.
 
2.1 Trade in water entitlements and allocations
 
Most irrigators in the southern Murray–Darling Basin hold a nominal
volumetric entitlement that is delivered as a share of an annual resource pool.
The yield of the entitlement depends on the size of the resource pool that,
in turn, depends on surface water run-off, storage capacity, and the way that
storages are  managed. Irrigators receive an annual volumetric allocation from
these rights that they can call on, in full or in part, during the irrigation season.
Entitlement speciﬁcations and yields can differ between jurisdictions. South
Australia and Victoria have the most conservative supply arrangements and
nominal entitlements have a yield of around 95–100 per cent. In New South
Wales around 10 per cent of entitlements are high security – similar to those in
Victoria and South Australia. The remainder has a yield of around 80 per cent
of entitlement. Further, there is a difference in the storage to allocation ratio
in New South Wales and Victoria and, as a result, supply reliabilities can be
affected signiﬁcantly by climatic conditions. 
Irrigators in the southern Murray–Darling Basin can trade both water
entitlements (‘permanent trade’) and seasonal water allocations (‘temporary
trade’). Most trade occurs in seasonal allocations, and it is common for 10–
20 per cent of allocations to be traded within an irrigation district in an irrigation
Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the southern Murray–Darling Basin. 
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 2004). Although trade in allocations has increased
over recent years, trade in water entitlements remains small, at less than 1 per
cent of diversions in 2001–2002. Low levels of interregional trade may be
partly explained by administrative impediments such as trade quotas imposed by
irrigation authorities that restrict out of district trade (Goesch 2001). There
are also a number of physical and environmental factors that impede interre-
gional trade (see Figure 1).
Two recent studies examined the effects of removing administrative imped-
iments to trade in the southern Murray–Darling Basin (see Box 1). Both studies
suggest that additional trade may be relatively small, even if impediments are
removed.
 
2.2 Implicit water rights and trade 
 
The development of irrigation in the southern Murray–Darling Basin created
a link between access to water, infrastructure, and land. Prior to the cap on
diversions being imposed, it was access to infrastructure rather than water re-
sources that limited surface water use. The link between water, infrastructure, and
land allowed the creation of water property rights that were largely implicit.
These implicit rights included access to a location-speciﬁc pool of resources,
storage facilities, and delivery channels, together with rights over the quantity
and quality of return ﬂows and conveyance losses (Goesch and Beare 2004). 
Trade can alter the implicit rights attached to those entitlements. When a
water entitlement that is deﬁned at the point of delivery is traded, for example,
Box 1  Expansion of trade in the southern Murray–Darling Basin
Heaney et al. (2004) used a competitive partial equilibrium model of water markets in the
southern Murray–Darling Basin to assess the economic impacts of water trade under
freer administrative arrangements and alternative charging options for water delivery.
This work suggests that removal of administrative impediments to trade will result in
around 600 GL of additional trade in permanent water entitlements. This represents a
relatively small share of total water use and partly reﬂects the large sunk investment in
on- and off-farm infrastructure. Although water may become more mobile as these invest-
ments reach the end of their economic life, the demand for water for environmental pur-
poses is likely to be an important driver of future trading patterns.  
Peterson et al. (2004) used a computable general equilibrium model to estimate the
regional impacts of expanding trade in the southern Murray–Darling Basin under a
number of scenarios where water availability was reduced by 10, 20, and 30 per cent.
With a 10 per cent reduction in water availability, total net water trade in the southern
Murray–Darling Basin was found to be a relatively small proportion of total allocations,
with only 2.3 per cent of allocations traded among regions. Similarly, under the same
scenario, net water exports or imports from a region were a small percentage of total
water allocations in that region. The Murrumbidgee region was projected to be the largest
net exporter of water with around 4 per cent of allocations traded out of the region. 
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the location from which it is sourced may change. This can have implications
for the infrastructure used to store and transport this water; therefore, the
speciﬁcation of resource access rights, and hence, the water market is incom-
plete. Implicit changes in resource access rights arising from trade may not always
affect other water users. Altering the location of storage and delivery infra-
structure from where water is sourced, for example, will not affect other users
if capacity constraints are not binding, but when and where these constraints are
binding, trade can impose third-party effects. In general, utilities currently
only approve trades if the trade is not likely to cause congestion.
 
3. Third-party effects of trade
 
Some of the key third-party effects of trade in entitlements and allocations in
the southern Murray–Darling Basin are reviewed in this section. 
 
3.1 Reliability of supply
 
The reliability of supply can be deﬁned in terms of the probability that an
entitlement holder will receive a volume of water in a given season – that is,
the expected level of variation in physical water allocations that are realised
from holding an entitlement. Supply reliability is determined by the natural
variability of the resource pool and by the institutional arrangements that
determine the share of that resource over which the entitlement is granted.
The reliability of supply can also be affected by storage and conveyance losses,
access to return ﬂows, and the introduction of tradable water entitlements.
The signiﬁcance of factors affecting supply reliability varies across the southern
Murray–Darling Basin. Importantly these factors are not currently explicitly




In the southern Murray–Darling Basin, entitlements are deﬁned at the point
of delivery. The number of potential sources from which these delivery points can
be supplied increases moving downstream as the effective catchment area
increases with tributary inﬂows. Unless traded entitlements retain the features
of the reliability of supply from the exporting catchment, net trade that spans
one or more tributaries can affect the reliability of entitlement in both the source
and the destination regions. If water is traded upstream of a tributary, a given
pool of resources may be spread over a greater number of users, thus decreasing
supply reliability for those users. At the same time, there is an increase in the




Prior to the introduction of tradable entitlements, unused allocations from irrigators who
did not exercise all or part of their entitlements were returned to the resource pool and reallocated.
This increased the yield of the entitlement of active water users. The introduction of trade
created an opportunity cost to irrigators who did not fully exercise their entitlements, which
effectively led to an increase in the number of shareholders in the resource pool. Although not
causing problems of efﬁciency, the distributional effects of this reallocation of resources
induced by the potential for trade slowed the reform process. 
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Loss of water through evaporation and, in some circumstances, seepage,
during storage and transport can reduce the availability of water for irrigation.
For example, changing patterns of trade can alter the timing of required
irrigation releases from the dam and, in turn, the period of time water is held
in storage. 
Conveyance can be either non-ﬂow dependent or ﬂow dependent and will
differ within and between irrigation regions. Non-ﬂow-dependent conveyance
losses, such as those associated with saturating earthen channels, occur
regardless of how much water is transported. Trade does not signiﬁcantly alter
non-ﬂow-dependent losses. Conversely, ﬂow-dependent losses vary depending
on how much water is transported and may be affected by trade. They may
occur, for example, if additional water caused the river to breach its banks.
Under traditional irrigation techniques, such as ﬂood and furrow, irrigation
run-off from farms is recycled via surface water run-off, drainage schemes,
and accession to groundwater tables that eventually reach the river system.
These ﬂows are included in calculations of the volume of water that is
allocated to downstream irrigators. However, irrigators presently hold an
implicit right to the return ﬂows in that they can trade or save water without
considering the downstream effects on other water users associated with
changes in water volume and quality. Water traded to an irrigator who employs
more efﬁcient on-farm water application techniques than the seller, for example,
may lead to a reduction in water available to downstream users and thus





Under current institutional arrangements, reductions in the volume of return
ﬂows are simply absorbed as an additional diversion above the cap that may
be at the expense of desired environmental ﬂows.
 
3.2 Timeliness of delivery
 
The reliability of the delivery of an allocation is the timeliness of delivery of
the water to the farm gate and depends on access to storage and delivery
infrastructure. Congestion can occur in the river system as a result of the
physical features of the river or within the irrigation system in near farm delivery
infrastructure. Increasing marginal congestion costs are borne by irrigators
and other water users through reduced timeliness of delivery on water orders.
Water trade can have an effect on third-party access to infrastructure if, for
example, water is traded from a scheme where channel capacity is rarely
reached into a scheme where capacity is often reached. Under current
institutional arrangements, this trade could reduce the reliability of delivery
for all irrigators in the destination region. 
Further costs will be imposed if, as commonly occurs, access to delivery
capacity for irrigators within a district is rationed on the basis of historical
allocation during times of congestion rather than on the basis of delivering to
those who face the greatest marginal costs associated with a shortfall in
deliveries. Trade into an irrigation area that worsens congestion can cause 
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further inefﬁciency if access is not rationed according to costs. An irrigator
on a local channel delivery system in the Goulburn–Murray Irrigation District,
for example, is only permitted to trade water to the farm if there is sufﬁcient
capacity in the channel system for the delivery not to affect the timeliness of
delivery of other irrigators on the channel. Trade that exacerbates channel
constrictions at the Barmah Choke is currently prohibited. Although this
may take account of the third-party effect of trade, non-market rationing
does not ensure that the irrigators with the greatest net return gain access to
the infrastructure. Congestion may also have environmental impacts if, for
example, it impedes the delivery of water to meet environmental outcomes.
Water utilities avoid on-river constraints, to some extent, by using a number
of rerouting mechanisms including moving water to downstream storages before
the start of the irrigation season. Losses from these storages through evapo-
ration and seepage are high and this, in turn, may have an effect on users’
security of supply. 
 
3.3 Storage and delivery charges
 
Trade in entitlements can result in a net trade of water permanently out of
an irrigation district. If utility costs are apportioned to a smaller number of
entitlements, charges for remaining irrigators may be higher. This may lead
to their trading water out of the region and, ultimately, the utility may no
longer provide irrigation water to the assets such as delivery channels, so the
infrastructure may cease to be used. This is sometimes referred to as the
‘stranded asset’ problem.








 policies – in
other words, whether the policy decision is made before or after utilities’




, the requirement for undertaking
and charging for an infrastructure investment (including infrastructure
replacement) is for the total beneﬁts of its creation and operation to be




, the infrastructure is a sunk asset that may
have little or no salvage value and may not be replaced. It may be economic to
operate that asset even if only covering variable costs. Inefﬁciency will arise if
the charging rule does not allow for this possibility. Remaining debt on the
infrastructure does not have economic efﬁciency implications although
there may be equity issues. 




 allocates ﬁxed and variable costs in an appropriate two-
part charging scheme, such as part of a long-term contract with irrigators,
the stranded assets problem seems to fall into the class of third-party effects
where there are no deadweight social losses. These effects are sometimes known
as a pecuniary externality. They are distinct from physical externalities, which
occur when water transfer affects the quality or quantity of water use. Pecuniary
externalities arise when the external effects are transmitted through higher
charges. The stranding of assets that result from the exit of entitlements from
an irrigation district can result in pecuniary externalities for the remaining 
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irrigators. To the extent that these third-party effects do not create deadweight
social losses, their removal does not improve economic efﬁciency (Katz and
Shapiro 1994; Hanak 2003).
Where a utility adopts an inappropriate pricing model, such as one that
allocates ﬁxed costs to a variable charge, trade can have efﬁciency implications




 2004). The average cost of delivery may rise in
source regions, whereas in the destination region, average costs may fall. These
artiﬁcial conditions of decreasing and increasing costs can distort the spatial pattern




Changes in water quality because of trade arise through changes in the
volume and quality of return ﬂows, including run-off, drainage, and ground-
water discharge and, to a lesser extent the movement of traded water through
the river system. Water quality may be affected if water is traded to an area
or industry that has different agronomic practices from the source area. If
water is traded to a use that relies more heavily on agrochemicals that may
reach waterways, for example, third-party costs may be imposed on downstream
water users.
Water quality issues in the River Murray system include river salinity, and
its effect on productive uses for water as well as river health. Much of the
increase in salinity can be attributed to subterranean return ﬂows through
the mobilisation of saline groundwater to the river system, a consequence of
high levels of groundwater recharge from excess irrigation water. Within the
southern Murray–Darling Basin, there is considerable variation in the salinity
of groundwater underlying irrigation areas. The highly location-speciﬁc
nature of the underlying hydrology means that the third-party effects of trade
on water quality depend on the source and the destination of the water traded.
Return ﬂows can either improve or reduce water quality depending on the
location of water use after trade, thus having either positive or negative
effects on users not directly engaged in the trade. Within the southern Murray–
Darling Basin system, for example, relatively fresh return ﬂows from areas
characterised by ﬂood irrigation technologies can reduce the river salinity
concentration. Conversely, return ﬂows from irrigation areas located above
high saline groundwater deposits can increase salinity in the River Murray.
The location-speciﬁc nature of these third-party effects is important for at
least two reasons. First, trade may lead to improvements in water quality,
and policy instruments that provide incentives to trade water to ‘low impact’
areas can generate positive environmental and economic outcomes. Second,
as the effects of trade vary with the source and the destination of the trade,
it is infeasible to fully internalise the effects of return ﬂows on others through
a system of private property rights. Potential policy initiatives for internalising
the impacts of negative third-party effects will be discussed in more detail in
the following section. 
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Water entitlements are access rights to the stream of beneﬁts (or costs)
derived from using water for irrigation. The property right is a claim over
some or all of the returns from water as a productive resource. Water trade is
an instrument whereby irrigators can enhance the value of that right. Third-
party effects from water trade arise if some of the beneﬁts (or costs) of that
action are not exclusive and not captured by the holder of the property right.
The set of markets for this right is incomplete, and the true value of that asset
will not be accurately reﬂected in its price.
 
4.1 The Randall framework
 
Developing effective policy instruments that will improve the management of
natural resources requires an understanding of why the market is incomplete.
Randall (1983) argued that the concepts of exclusiveness and rivalry represent
the characteristics of goods and resources that matter in a public policy context.
Randall’s classiﬁcation of goods is presented in Table 1, along with some
illustrative examples. 
Under an exclusive property right, an individual bears all the beneﬁts
and liabilities associated with consuming or producing a good or service.
An exclusive property right is complete if it conveys all the costs and liabilities
of either production or consumption. If a property right does not convey sole
rights and liabilities, it is non-exclusive. If access to this right is restricted to
a subset of individuals, such as a club, it is hyperexclusive; the limiting cases
are monopoly or monopsony access. 
A good or service is rival if its consumption or production by one individual
has an impact on the consumption or production of others. Consumption and
production of non-rival goods does not alter the choice set or incentives faced by
other producers and consumers. Congestible goods are non-rival up to some point
but as consumption or production increases, delays begin to occur that impose costs.
Properties of exclusivity and rivalry can reﬂect the institutional arrangements
that deﬁne property rights that exist over goods and services. Governments
may grant resource access rights that are open, exclusive, or even hyperexclusive.
Table 1 Randall classiﬁcation of goods based on exclusivity and rivalry
Category Exclusive Hyperexclusive Non-exclusive
Rival Water entitlement or 
allocation
Allocation of water 





Non-rival On-farm saving of 
evaporative losses
  Improved water quality 
Ecosystem services
Congestible Tradable infrastructure 
access right
Congestion charge by 
a delivery utility
Open access delivery 
channel 
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For example, water entitlements are exclusive in nature but access to the resource
pool is capped by government – a form of hyperexclusion. The properties of
exclusivity and rivalry may also be intrinsic to a commodity or service in that
they limit the nature of the property right that can cost-effectively be placed
over that good or service. For example, existence values are intrinsically non-
rival and the costs of excluding individuals from the amenity beneﬁts of natural
resources is often prohibitive. 
Beare and Newby (2005) note that exclusivity and rivalry can exist in both
production and consumption of goods and services and that this can have
implications for the design of an appropriate policy instrument. For example,
unregulated emissions may generate non-exclusive damages in consumption
and are non-rival in production in that one ﬁrm’s emissions do not limit
another’s. User or beneﬁciary charges may not lead to an efﬁcient solution to
the problem because of the transactions costs of compulsory charges and the
incentive for beneﬁciaries to under-invest in abatement. However, a cap on
emissions, another form of hyperexclusion, creates rivalry in production,
allowing the introduction of a tradable permit scheme.
Randall (1983) argues that the joint classiﬁcation of exclusivity and rivalry
characterise a good or service and determines the most efﬁcient means of
provision and trade. Beare and Newby (2005) observe that the policy options
available to complete a market are largely determined by characteristics of
exclusion and rivalry in the missing primary good or goods. The Randall
classiﬁcation provides a framework to examine policy instruments to address
third-party effects of trade that can arise in incomplete water markets.
 
4.2 Reliability of supply
 
Water entitlements are not fully exclusive (even though they are rivals)
because they are not deﬁned according to the location from which they are
sourced. Consequently, trade in water entitlements fails to account for storage
and conveyance losses and return ﬂows. The lack of exclusion gives rise to
third-party effects on the reliability of supply of an entitlement. Trade in
water entitlements that do not take into account jurisdictional differences
in the reliability of supply speciﬁcations can also generate third-party impacts.
The third-party effects of trade on reliability of an entitlement can be
addressed using a source-based, property rights solution, which adds a further
component to the current water right. One option is to redeﬁne the entitlement
from the point of delivery to the source of extraction to make the conveyance




  (2005) suggest that a system of
administered exchange rates could be used to account for the differences in
the yield of an entitlement. An exchange rate may be used, for example, to
account for trade resulting in a 10 per cent increase in conveyance losses, by
converting the volume purchased to 90 per cent of the volume sold. Where
there were no conveyance losses, the exchange rate determined would result
in no net change in demand for water from the system on average. 
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Exchange rates, however, can be difﬁcult to specify correctly so that efﬁciency
losses do not occur. Appropriate exchange rates would need to be location
speciﬁc and sufﬁciently ﬂexible (including being adjustable retrospectively) to
allow for changes in factors affecting supply security, such as changes to
water sharing plans and long term climate change.
Water trading has been shown to have an effect on the reliability of supply
of third parties through changes in patterns of return ﬂows that alter the
quantity of water available for irrigation downstream (Heaney and Beare
2001). This problem arises because water property rights are currently deﬁned in
terms of water diversions rather than the volume of water that is consumed.
Although these third-party effects are non-exclusive, they may be amenable
to a property right solution if the transaction costs of deﬁning and measuring
return ﬂows are not prohibitive. This solution will be particularly complex
when accounting for changes in water quality, because a fraction of non-
consumed water will return to the river system in an altered state, possibly
generating downstream costs or beneﬁts.
Trade in allocations, on the other hand, only affects supply reliability
where there are differences in the conveyance losses between the source of
supply and destination of the water after the trade. If the extra ﬂow created
by the trade does not result in water breeching the banks of the distribution
network and the trade occurs when distribution networks are full (as is usually
the case with trade during peak irrigation period) the potential for further
loss is greatly diminished as the distribution network is usually fully saturated
and evaporation losses are not altered as the surface area of the channel is
unchanged. Overall, conveyance losses are likely to be small relative to overall
releases from storages (see, for example, Pratt Water 2004).
 
4.3 Timeliness of delivery
 
Irrigation delivery channels are generally referred to as congestible goods be-
cause they exhibit non-rival characteristics for a limited number of users or levels
of use. Rivalry sets in once this limit is exceeded, and intensiﬁes as the number
of users increases.
Because demand for delivery capacity is highly seasonal and subject to periods
of expansion and contraction, it is seldom optimal to invest in delivery capacity
to meet periods of peak demand. Although congestion does impose costs,
it does not necessarily follow that there is a need to ration access to minimise
congestion costs. Where all irrigators seeking access to delivery infrastructure
face the same marginal cost of delay, delivering services on a ‘ﬁrst come, ﬁrst
served’ basis will lead to optimal allocation. Where irrigators face different
marginal costs associated with a delay, however, delivery services must be
rationed in some way to ensure that those irrigators with the greatest net
return gain access.
It may be possible to reduce congestion costs by allocating access rights to
delivery infrastructure and by allowing trade in those rights, if the right to 
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access water and delivery infrastructure were separated and made explicit.
Alternatively, congestion charging may be used during periods of congestion
when services are rival, and where irrigators face differing marginal costs of
congestion. By increasing peak period access charges during congestion,
those irrigators facing higher congestion costs will be most prepared to pay
the extra charges. Congestion pricing will have no rationing effect during
continual congestion and will result in economic rents accruing to the infra-
structure supplier, signalling a possible need for increases in capacity.
Further, rationing access to delivery infrastructure will only lead to a more
efﬁcient allocation of resources once rivalry sets in. Tradable access rights
or congestion charging will create an inefﬁcient exclusivity (rent seeking) if
imposed when access to the infrastructure is non-rival.
With small net trade (see Box 1), third-party effects are most likely to be
limited to near farm delivery infrastructure where trade causes or exacerbates peak
period congestion. Even then, trade may only cause problems during a relatively
small number of peak demand days. Net trade into an irrigation area is more
likely to exacerbate peak period congestion in systems with similar agricultural
enterprises (for example, rice production) because the timing of demand for
water is likely to be similar across the region. Areas characterised by large variation
in agricultural production may be less likely to have peaks in water demand.
 
4.4 Storage and delivery charges
 
Problems related to storage and delivery charges were identiﬁed in Section 2
as potentially having both equity and efﬁciency aspects. The policy challenge
posed by pecuniary externalities, similar to the challenge arising from
agricultural trade liberalisation, is an equity issue (Hanak 2005). If govern-
ments wish to intervene, however, constraining trade arrangements is unlikely
to be the most efﬁcient and effective mechanism to use.
The efﬁciency aspect of the problem may have arisen for two reasons. The
first reason for inefﬁciency could stem from missing options markets for access to
storage and delivery infrastructure. Purchase of such options would be akin to
joining a club. Club goods are a class of public goods that are exclusive in consu-





 would allow long-term contracts to be established such that the
actions of club members (such as exit) may not harm other members of the club.




, for example, through adopting a two-part charging scheme for allocating




, where the asset might not be replaced, this
could be addressed through more ﬂexible pricing agreements between the utility
and the irrigator, such as marginal cost pricing. However, under current
institutional arrangements, there are restrictions to utilities adopting such a
regime.
When weighing up the beneﬁts and costs of government intervention related
to stranded assets (or for any other reason), it is important to consider the 
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positive as well as negative third-party effects that can result from trade. Positive
effects associated with permanent water trade include the alleviation of con-
gestion and pressure on groundwater tables in the exporting district, and greater
economies of scale in the importing region. If governments wish to assist
affected irrigators, they should choose instruments that are targeted and that
do not impose unnecessary cost on other parties.
Inappropriate intervention to address stranded asset concerns can reduce
efﬁciency. Restrictions on trade are the most common example in Australia.




 exit fees, for example, can lock water into low-
productivity enterprises and regions. There is opportunity for the utility to
rationalise its delivery system with asset redundancy, for example, by decom-
missioning or ‘mothballing’ redundant infrastructure. Some parts of the local
distribution network may no longer be needed because water is no longer
diverted from the main distribution network to smaller feeder channels to the
irrigator’s farm. The utility could then reduce charges to reﬂect the new patterns
of infrastructure use. There may also be opportunities for the utilities to
negotiate exits with irrigators. 
In the absence of trade constraints, the incidence of stranded assets will be
highest in regions where the marginal value product of water is lowest (for
example, where a signiﬁcant proportion of water is used for lower value
activities), or in areas facing environmental degradation problems (for example,
rising saline water tables). Localised channel and diversion infrastructure
have been the main utility assets affected by trade in entitlements in the
Goulburn–Murray Irrigation District to date. The net exit of entitlements in
Goulburn–Murray Water subdistricts has tended to be geographically con-
centrated, with some subdistricts frequently reaching their quota. This may,
in part, reﬂect commodity prices and salinity (see, for example, Barr 1999).
Other factors, such as the size of the farm, the age of the irrigator, and their
off-farm income are also likely to be important inﬂuences. 
If administrative constraints to trade were removed, modeling suggests
small net exit from irrigation regions, indicating that the rise in costs to
remaining irrigators will be correspondingly small (see Box 1). Even where
some subdistricts lost a third of irrigators over the decade, utility charges would













A67 per megalitre in 2004–2005 (during the 2002–2003
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Goulburn–Murray Water allocates 220 000 megalitres of water to entitlements on 1260
properties (including stock and domestic supplies) in the Pyramid Hill subdistrict. Annual
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in revenue annually. If a third of entitlements and properties left the subdistrict, there would




A1.65 million. To recover this loss, from the remaining
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the traded prices for allocations and are, therefore, unlikely to inﬂuence









Major infrastructure assets such as dam and diversion infrastructure are
unlikely to be affected. The cost of major dam infrastructure is passed on
through trade, and entitlements are traded to meet the water needs of the
purchaser. Just as the seller has relied on major infrastructure to store and deliver
the water allocated to the entitlement in the past, so too will the purchaser in
the future, regardless of whether the trade is intradistrict or interdistrict, or




The effect of trade on water quality is intrinsically non-exclusive. For example,
trade out of a high-impact area that reduces saline discharge to the river would
beneﬁt all downstream users. Further, because the beneﬁts accruing to water users
differ according to their location, high transaction costs may prevent downstream
users from collaborating to encourage investment upstream to improve water qual-
ity. Both these factors limit the usefulness of property right solutions that can
capture the beneﬁts of trade between parties. As a consequence, policies need
to be directed to those activities that are the source for abatement of pollution.
Water-use rights may be used to impose speciﬁc conditions of use on irrigators.
These rights may be regulations that apply to the location and intensity of
water use, for example, in high-impact zones. Limits may be placed on the
type of soil that can be used for particular activities, and maximum water
application rates and standards may be imposed on water use efﬁciency.
Regulations can, however, be inﬂexible. Imposing a maximum application
rate, for example, will prevent irrigators from applying additional water in
dry years, even if the beneﬁts vastly outweigh the social costs. The conditions
of water use rights can include the use of ﬂexible economic instruments
including levies, subsidies, or exchange rates; for example, an irrigator might
be required to purchase a salinity credit from a salt extraction scheme to
offset the impact of saline drainage water discharge. 
A form of water-use right is currently implemented in the Murrumbidgee
Valley, where rice production is limited to areas of speciﬁc soil types, and
where maximum water application rates are imposed. These use rights are
effectively tied to the land. Use rights can also be applied speciﬁcally to deal
with the change in third-party effects associated with use when water is
traded. Where the transfer of water results in an increase in external costs, for
example, it may be possible to impose a levy on the use of water traded into
that region. The levy revenue could be used to provide an incentive to trade
water from regions with high external costs to regions with lower external
costs. This approach currently is used by Sunraysia District where differential
charging is applied depending on the source and destination of the trade.
Because the effects of water use vary continuously according to location in
the river system, a levy or subsidy must be source and destination speciﬁc. A 
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system of exchange rates could also be used to deal with third-party effects,
for example, if water trade between regions results in an increase in salinity
downstream of the recipient region, an irrigator may be required to purchase
water in excess of requirements. This additional water would be used as a
dilution ﬂow to offset the increased salinity arising from this trade (Beare
and Heaney 2002; Goesch and Beare 2004).
From a producer’s point of view, unregulated pollution is non-rival – that
is, the discharge of pollution by one producer does not affect the ability other
producers to pollute. It is possible, however, to make water quality rival by
creating tradable use rights and establishing a market for pollution caused by
water use that meets some ‘target’ level of pollution at least cost. A tradable
salinity credit scheme could, for example, be used to control the level of
saline emissions from an irrigation scheme. Salinity credits equivalent to the
desired level of emissions from the scheme would be initially allocated to
irrigators. Once allocated, these credits represent an asset that can be traded.
Irrigators with a lower marginal cost of abatement will have an incentive to
sell credits to irrigators with a higher marginal cost of abatement.
The effects of trade on River Murray water quality have been shown to be
considerable, depending on the source and destination of the trade (Heaney
and Beare 2001). Net trade into the highly saline regions of South Australia
and Victoria, for example, imposes costs on downstream water users through
higher salt concentration of water used for productive purposes and also
affects the riverine environment more generally. In contrast, regional trade
between irrigation areas with similar agronomic and hydrological characteristics




The separation of water entitlements from land failed to account for the spa-
tial characteristics of water supply, demand and use that were implicit in the
joint right. Trade in water entitlements and allocations have therefore given
rise to third-party effects. The existence of third-party effects has been cited
as a reason to restrict or prohibit intra- and interregional trade in the southern
Murray–Darling Basin.
Third-party effects on delivery reliability are likely to be relatively localised
and small in terms of scale and cost, but nonetheless amenable to property
right solutions. Other effects have the potential to be more substantial, such
as some of the effects on the security of supply. Accounting for differences in
entitlement speciﬁcation between jurisdictions, for example, would generate
considerable beneﬁts if there were large volumes of water traded between states.
Although for the most part, these third-party effects can be addressed
through the introduction of more completely speciﬁed water rights, the creation,
implementation, and enforcement of property rights regimes is not costless.
In some instances, the costs of property right solutions may be higher than
the beneﬁts they generate. The regionally speciﬁc nature of the third-party 
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impacts of trade examined in this paper highlight the need to recognise
regional characteristics of surface and groundwater systems, soil, and climate
as well as investments in ﬁxed infrastructure when considering policy inter-
ventions. Adding a further component to existing property rights to account
for the water quality effects of water traded within the Goulburn–Broken
region, for example, may generate costs that exceed the beneﬁts. The same
action attached to water used in the highly saline regions of South Australia,
on the other hand, may generate considerable beneﬁts and allow the beneﬁts
of trade to be fully realised. Similarly, if the costs imposed by water losses
and trade restrictions as a result of the current management of capacity con-
straints such as the Barmah Choke are such that they warrant intervention,
property rights or pricing regimes to ration access may be considered as
appropriate policy interventions. 
It is likely that many of the third-party effects of trade discussed in this
paper do not warrant policy intervention at the national or state level. In
some instances, effects are likely to be relatively minor although some may be
signiﬁcant at the local level. The costs of addressing some third-party effects
may outweigh the beneﬁts. Where there are signiﬁcant gains from trade, the
existence of these third-party effects should not be seen as a reason to impede
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